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In its current configuration, Security Studies tends to analyse the relationship between 
security, resilience, and non-security politics in cases where the issue of concern has been 
securitized, when some issue already has the status function and label of a security issue. 
While some of the early works on desecuritization, the dismantlement of security issues 
(Huysmans 2006), suggested that desecuritization could be pre-emptive by nature 
(Wæver 1989a, 1995, 2000), i.e. about keeping issues off security agendas, the vast 
majority of this literature has operated on the assumption that both desecuritization and 
resilience processes occur after — or in response to — securitization processes. Our 
contention in the present article is to provide more conceptual nuance for the triangular 
relationships between the statuses of security, resilience, and non-security politics, which 
aids the comprehension of how issues move along and remain within these political 
nexuses.  
Our triangle of political moves and status function highlights situations and dynamics that 
have not received sufficient attention in previous debates in the field. This is certainly the 
case for situations where security as a status function is not yet established, but is being 
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internationally contested, or is domestically still brewing. More elaborate 
conceptualizations of these kinds of pre-security dynamics are timely because both 
studies of desecuritization and resilience have in recent years been two fast-growing areas 
of research within the field of security studies. Securitization dynamics have been one 
branch of this literature. Here, a number of conceptualizations of longer term 
securitization processes have been developed. Such studies have shown how 
securitization includes both exceptionalist security discourses and routinized practices 
(Bourbeau 2014), thereby describing securitization as a gradual and fluctuating process 
(Salter and Mutlu 2013: 818) with periods where the threats can have more or less 
urgency or likelihood (Vuori 2010: 270). Scholars have also pointed out that 
securitization processes should be understood in scalar terms that encompass the 
possibility of variation across and within cases across time (Bourbeau 2011). Security 
issues can be “institutionalized”, whereby the story of necessity and emergency need not 
be continuously repeated (Buzan et al. 1998: 28), and issues that have gone away from 
security agendas can be “re-securitized” (Åtland and Brusgaard 2009). Most recently, 
Amir Lupovici (2014) has posited the notion of “securitization climax”, where a 
previously securitized issue is made to regain a prominent security status after a period of 
having an institutionalized security status, after having been partly desecuritized, or as a 
gradual intensification of necessary measures.  
On the side on desecuritization dynamics, the Copenhagen School (CoS) initially 
understood desecuritization as the process of taking an issue out of the 
security/emergency mode and returning it into the political sphere (Buzan, Wæver et al. 
1998, Wæver 1995). The first discussions about desecuritization were about how it could 
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be achieved (Huysmans 1995, Wæver 2000). In later development, the literature on 
desecuritization has focused on three sets of questions: what counts as desecuritization 
(identification of the phenomenon), why should there be desecuritization (ethics and 
normativity), and how can desecuritization be achieved (transformative practice) 
(Balzacq et al. 2015).  
Overall, desecuritization has been viewed as the unmaking of securitization (Huysmans 
2006) that comes about either as a fading away of the issue (Behnke 2006) or through 
initiation with active moves (de Wilde 2008, Donnelly 2015). While the normative push 
of the CoS approach has been towards desecuritization, the literature on it has been 
criticised for eschewing politics (Aradau 2004), and biasing desecuritization when it is 
not necessarily morally better than securitization (Floyd 2011).1 Some view 
desecuritization as akin to securitization: for Rita Floyd (2015), desecuritization is a set 
of actions that can be morally evaluated as a time-limited event, while Juha Vuori (2011a, 
2014) has treated desecuritization as a counter-move to securitization in processes of 
contestation and resistance. Others have favoured a return to the initial political purposes 
of the concept, like Lene Hansen (2012) who has sought to recover the political status of 
desecuritization with an examination of the ontological and practical levels involved in 
empirical investigation of desecuritization processes.2 Here, Faye Donnelly (2015) 
                                                
1 For example, the securitization of former male soldiers and effective desecuritization of former female 
soldiers in Sierra Leone has reproduced gendered roles for the detriment of the females (MacKenzie 2009). 
2 The literature on desecuritization has already become too broad to be thoroughly reviewed in a non-
review article. For different views on desecuritization and empirical case studies, see Huysmans (1995, 
1998), Roe (2004), Jutila (2006), Behnke (2006), Paltemaa and Vuori (2006), de Wilde (2008), Aras and 
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suggests that desecuritization moves can be conceptualized as both speech and other 
symbolic acts by examining how desecuritization moves can be accomplished after 
several decades of institutionalized securitization. 
As the above conceptualizations suggest, desecuritization tends to be viewed as a post 
hoc move or process in relation to security. In a similar vein, resilience – defined as the 
process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of 
endogenous or exogenous shocks – made its entry into security studies as a societal 
strategy to adjust to a situation that is already securitized. The objective is not to 
transform security or to take an issue out of the security realm (i.e. to desecuritize it) but 
rather to enhance practices that promote social and community resilience in the face of an 
increasingly securitized world. For instance, Paul D. Williams (2013) demonstrates with 
indisputable clarity that building resilient local communities is one of the best ways to 
reduce violence against civilians in contemporary war zones ― where security dynamics 
are certainly already fully developed. Similarly, Diane Davis and her team have shown 
how enhancing the resilience of social institutions tangibly reduced urban violence in 
Medellin, Columbia, one of the most violent cities in the world (Davis 2012). 
Furthermore, resilience is identified as one of the four strategies (together with 
desecuritization, resistance, and emancipation) for contesting security in Thierry 
Balzacq’s (2015) edited volume with the very title. In the concluding chapter to that 
book, Lene Hansen (2015) points out that resilience shares with these other concepts a 
                                                                                                                                            
Karakaya Polat (2008), Salter (2008), MacKenzie (2009), Vuori (2011a), Hansen (2000, 2012), Biba 
(2013), Donnelly (2015). 
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commitment to an ontopological engagement with security ― that is, a critical 
engagement with security to contest the predominance of a particular security reading of 
an issue.  
Despite the above important contributions and types of discussion in the 
conceptualization of securitization, desecuritization, and resilience dynamics, it remains 
the case that little space is left for considering the possibility that desecuritization and 
resilience discourses, as well as practices, precede the implementation of security 
dynamics. This is because the literature consistently frames desecuritization and 
resilience as processes that take place after an issue has been securitized. 
The overarching objective of this article is to tell a different socio-political story of the 
connections between desecuritization, resilience, and securitization. In order to do this, 
we present a triangular model of dual relationships among security, resilience, and non-
security politics (see Figure 1 below). By doing so, we propose a theorization of the 
relations among these concepts that takes into account not only instances in which 
desecuritization moves and resiliencization moves3 follow security, but also instances in 
which desecuritization and resilience arise before security – when securitization is still 
brewing.  
The argument proceeds as follows. The first section presents our triangular model for 
studying the relationships among security, resilience, and non-security politics. The 
subsequent sections detail our theorization of each relationship pair. Section two focuses 
                                                
3 We propose the neologism ‘resiliencization’ move to designate attempts by a society or an individual to 
adopt patterned adjustments in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks.  
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on the security–non-security politics nexus; section three analyses the interconnections 
between security and resilience; and, section four tackles the link between resilience and 
non-security politics. Empirical vignettes will be employed throughout our discussion to 
illustrate key points of our argument.  
Our triangular model: a sextet of relationships 
Students of security studies are still struggling with many difficult questions associated 
with the process of securitization (Buzan et al. 1998), such as the question of change and 
continuity in the securitization process and how societies/individuals navigate through, 
facilitate, or limit the securitization process (Bourbeau 2011, Vuori 2011b). It is no 
coincidence that resilience and desecuritization have emerged as distinct and dynamic 
fields of research in security studies; in their search for a better understanding and 
convincing explanation for the questions raised above, scholars have found it increasingly 
useful to expand the tool kit provided by key securitization models, theories, and schools 
(Buzan et al. 1998, Balzacq 2011, Bourbeau 2014, Vuori 2014, Stritzel 2014).  
In the present article, we suggest a number of strategies for tackling the analytical 
stalemates that securitization research is currently facing; in doing so, we capitalize on a 
broader understanding of the relationships among securitization, desecuritization, and 
resilience than is currently prevalent in the literature. In particular, throughout the article, 
we will contend that there are areas of potential convergence and complementarity that 
the literature (as currently organized) insufficiently appreciates. Indeed, the current 
benchmark in securitization research – i.e. the CoS – puts forward a parsimonious set of 
arguments regarding the sequence in the securitization process. An issue moves from (a) 
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being politicized, to (b) being securitized, and finally and hopefully to (c) being 
desecuritized (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998, Wæver 1995). However, a general assumption 
of complementarity and simultaneity forces us to deconstruct this sequential view of 
contemporary social worlds by injecting more nuanced pre-security dynamics into the 
study of the relationship between politics, security, and patterns of adjustments. As our 
triangle of dynamics displays (Figure 1), desecuritization moves may be in play even 
when an issue is not yet within the realm of security, and similarly, practices of resilience 
may trigger a process of securitization, rather than emerging exclusively as a response to 
securitizing moves.  
We conceptualize the poles of the triangular relationships (Figure 1) in the vein of the 
Copenhagen approach to security and politics (Wæver 1995, Buzan et al. 1998). While 
security policies deal with “worst case scenarios” and dire threats, a non-conflictual 
relationship between actors tends to be more conducive for trade and diplomacy. This has 
lead Ole Wæver (1995) to emphasise that often a non-security reality would be 
normatively preferable to a security reality. He also reminds us that a-security or non-
security should not be confused with insecurity: security is a situation where there is a 
threat with measures against it, whereas insecurity is a situation where there is a threat 
and no certain measures to counteract it. What is desirable is desecuritization, which 
leads back to a-security or non-security, a situation where there is no threat, and thus no 
need for restrictive measures. Indeed, for Wæver (1995), desecuritization is a process by 
which security issues lose their “securityness”, and are no longer restrictive by nature. 
In the triangle (Figure 1), then, “non-security politics” refers to situations where issues 
are considered to be on the agenda of political units and to abide by political rationales 
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other than that of security. “Security” in the figure, signifies a situation where an issue 
has the status function of security with concomitant deontic rights and duties that such a 
status entails, and thereby abides with the rationale of security. Finally, “resilience” refers 
to situations where endogenous or exogenous shocks have been dealt with patterned 
adjustments to maintain the status quo, to implement marginal changes, or to renew a 
given policy. The arrows in the figure represent political moves that aim to transform an 
issue from one status to another, or to keep the current status and repel a status 
transformation. 
 
[Figure 1: Triangular relationship of security, resilience, and non-security politics] 
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The first relation-arrow in the figure is the one between security and non-security politics 
from the viewpoint of security (1). This is the received reading of desecuritization where 
a security issue is dismantled, and desecuritization is viewed as a political move and 
process away from security. In terms of Hansen’s (2012) ideal models of desecuritization 
(see below), “replacement”,  “rearticulation”, and “silencing” can be included here. 
The second arrow or relation engages the same nexus, but from the viewpoint of non-
security politics. This arrow represents the usual story of securitization (2a), i.e. the move 
from politics to the realm of security, but it also includes desecuritization as a political 
move that originates from a non-security situation (2b). This second aspect of the relation 
represents political moves that aim to keep issues away from security, which gives this 
aspect of the arrow a slightly different logic to the others; the first desecuritization arrow 
(1) represents what happens when security turns into a-security, whereas the second (2b) 
is about what desecuritization does in order to keep away from a security status for an 
issue. Moves here include Hansen’s (2012) ideal model of “change through 
stabilization”, and what we term “pre-emptive desecuritization as rebuttal”. 
The third and fourth arrows represent the security-resilience nexus. From the viewpoint 
of security (3), resilience can be mobilized in order to respond, and adjust to a securitized 
situation. The move here is not to transform security, or to desecuritize the issue, but 
rather to enhance practices that build social and community resilience in the face of an 
increasingly securitized world. From the viewpoint of resilience (4), resilience can drive 
and induce security. Here, resilience speaks to the idea of protecting a society’s “way of 
life”, an objective that is made possible by the enactment of security policies and 
practices. 
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Finally, the fifth and sixth arrows represent the resilience-non-security politics nexus. 
From the resilience viewpoint (5), while resilience is sometimes about maintaining the 
status quo (in which capacity it can induce security as in arrow four), on other occasions, 
it can be about renewal. By inducing profound change of public policy, resilience can 
lead to desecuritization and a-security. From the viewpoint of non-security politics (6), 
once an issue is desecuritized, resilience practices can be deployed to keep the issue in 
the a-security realm. Here, resilience practices can help to “lock in” a desecuritized 
reading of an issue. 
We will now examine these nexuses in more detail and provide some illustrative 
empirical vignettes for them. 
 
Securitization and Desecuritization 
The ceteris paribus normative push, and political recommendation of the securitization 
approach has been “less security, more politics”, and the development of “possible 
modalities” for the desecuritization of politics (Wæver 1989a: 52): it is generally (which 
can only be assessed in practice though) more conducive to treat identities as identities, 
religion as religion, the environment as the environment, and so on, and to engage their 
politics through the particular modalities and rationalities of those fields rather than those 
of security. In the received reading, whilst securitization raises issues into the realm of 
security policies and practices (Arrow 2a in Figure 1), desecuritization lowers issues back 
into the realm of “regular politics” or removes issues from the political agenda altogether 
(Arrow 1 in Figure 1). 
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Desecuritization can be achieved through a number of options: by simply not talking 
about issues in terms of security, by keeping responses to securitized issues in forms that 
do not create security dilemmas or other vicious spirals, and by moving security issues 
back into “normal politics” (Wæver 2000: 253). These options can follow objectivist, 
constructivist, or deconstructivist strategies in bringing about desecuritization (Huysmans 
(1995: 65-67). These differ in regard to how the process relates to the claimed threat: has 
the threat been dealt with, can the security drama be somehow handled from without, or 
can identities beyond security threats be produced from within the process. 
Beyond conceptualizing desecuritization as an option or a strategy, it has also been 
viewed from the viewpoint of political actors (de Wilde 2008: 597), and their political 
moves in games of contestation and resistance (Vuori 2011a, 2015). There can be 
desecuritizing actors who evade, circumvent, or directly oppose securitizing moves by, 
for example, emphasizing competing threats (de Wilde 2008: 597). Security policies aim 
at desecuritization (the solution to the threatening situation), but desecuritization can also 
happen independently from the actions of securitizing or desecuritizing actors: the 
original security problem may be solved, institutions may adapt through new 
reproductive structures, discourses may change (e.g. with the loss of interest or 
audiences), and the original referent object may be lost (de Wilde 2008). 
A key issue of debate has been on whether desecuritization can be considered to be an 
active political process, or whether desecuritization can only happen as a fading away of 
the issue (Behnke 2006: 65): the question is whether the logic and possibility of 
securitization is necessarily retained in explicit discussions of whether an issue has 
retained the status of a security issue. As empirical studies of securitization and 
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desecuritization dynamics (e.g. Salter and Multu 2013, Lupovici 2014, Vuori 2015, 
Donnelly 2015) have shown, it is difficult to point to a definitive end-point for either 
securitization or desecuritization: political and social situations evolve. Whichever the 
philosophical stance on how and whether desecuritization can be achieved (Vuori 2011a), 
such empirical studies show that political actors do make active desecuritization moves. 
Indeed, systematizing empirical studies of desecuritization, Hansen (2012: 529; 539-545) 
has identified four ideal type forms for the concept. In regard to its issues of concern, 
namely the status of enmity and the possibility of a public sphere, when a larger conflict 
is still within the realm of possibility, but when a particular issue is presented with terms 
other than security, we have an instance of (1) “change through stabilisation” (Arrow 2b 
in Figure 1); when another issue takes the place of a previously securitized issue, we have 
(2) “replacement”; when the originally phrased threat is resolved, we have (3) 
rearticulation; and finally, when potentially insecure subjects are marginalized through 
depoliticization, we have (4) “silencing” (types 2-3 are represented by arrow 1 in Figure 
1). 
The previous literature on both securitization (Arrow 2a in Figure 1) and desecuritization 
(Arrow 1 in Figure 1) have produced ample illustrations of both dynamics. As a brief 
example of how both dynamics can alter between the same political actors, we can use 
some of the vicissitudes of Sino-Soviet relations.  
China entered the Cold War in the Soviet camp and relied on the Soviet Union as the 
guarantee of the international security of the new People’s Republic. Chinese views in the 
late 1940s clearly structured the world into two opposing camps, with China firmly in the 
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Soviet one (Mao 1949). In the 1950s, however, Sino-Soviet relations soured, and the 
following “Sino-Soviet split” (Lüthi 2008) has been used as an example of the capacity of 
“parochial” securitizations to become disaffected by or even be withdrawn from 
dominant “macrosecuritizations” (Buzan and Wæver 2009: 257).  
Following the split, Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s were characterized by intensive 
ideological conflict, and Mao Zedong securitized Soviet revisionism as a major threat for 
the Chinese Communist Party (Vuori 2011b). Indeed, newly available documents suggest 
that it was the Chinese side, in effect Mao Zedong, which was more active in the pursuit 
of ideological conflict (Lüthi 2008: 2). In his securitization of the Soviet Union, Mao 
linked the revisionism he identified there to that which he also securitized domestically 
(Vuori 2011b), and the issue of revisionism was presented as an issue of life and death 
for the party. 
Sino-Soviet relations began to mend in the 1980s with the removal of a number of 
political obstacles and with the intensification of the conflict between the US and the 
Soviet Union (Wishnick 2001). Yet, it is only with the fall of the Soviet Union that we 
can see an overall desecuritization in the form of rearticulation (Hansen 2012: 542-544) 
taking place in Sino-Russian relations. In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, 
China’s line was not to take the lead in international affairs. China worked towards 
“world multipolarization”, which was exemplified with China and Russia forming a 
“strategic partnership” in 1996. China and Russia even shared the same “threat package” 
of “terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism” (the “three evils”) within the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Jackson 2006: 310). These are strong indicators of 
how the two states have managed to reform their identities away from the Sino-Soviet 
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antagonism. In the overall state relations then, we can see a rearticulative desecuritization 
tactic at play on both sides: ever since the early 1980s, China’s policy towards the Soviet 
Union (and later Russia) shifted from antagonism to one of collaboration and negotiation 
rather than securitization. 
Desecuritization can be conceptualised in the above manner as a negative ontological 
corollary to securitization. Yet, it is also prudent to investigate securitization and 
desecuritization as political moves in order to potentially understand the logic of when 
and how they are wielded in practical politics. It is proposed here that in addition to 
instances where a securitized situation is dismantled (Arrow 1 in Figure 1), 
desecuritization can also be viewed as a political move that can be deployed before 
“securitization plays” in a game of securitization (Arrow 2a in Figure 1). In other words, 
desecuritization moves – both in terms of discourse and practice – can be used in a pre-
emptive manner before the threshold of securitization is reached (Arrow 2b in Figure 1). 
For Wæver (2000: 254), silencing can be a strategy to “pre-empt or forestall 
securitization”. We argue here that beyond silencing, active desecuritization efforts can 
be made to block the escalation of a contention. Thereby, in addition to change through 
stabilization (Hansen 2012) and the silencing of an issue (Wæver 2000), there can be 
explicit rebuttals of security frames and claims before they are solidified into policy. This 
tactic can be termed pre-emptive desecuritization through rebuttal. 
The kind of posture and dynamic captured by the notion of pre-emptive desecuritization 
is evident from the foreign policy maxims of the People’s Republic of China since the 
late 1970s, and particularly after the end of the Cold War. These maxims represent a 
strategy of avoiding conflict, that is, of avoiding other actors’ securitization threshold. 
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Such an overall stance has been deployed to create a peaceful or non-threatening 
reputation for China; indeed, a threat reputation would be damaging for an aspiring great 
power (Deng 2008: 102-103). As Hansen (2012: 536) notes, a key concern for political 
moves that form desecuritization has been to avoid security responses by authorities.4 
The same applies to states too: states can aim to alleviate security responses through their 
reputation for example (Deng 2008).  
China’s overall stance is very close to how desecuritization was imagined by Wæver 
(1989b: 314) before the concept itself was launched: “More and more trans-national 
activities should become purely ‘economic’, ‘social’ and ‘political’”, rather than issues of 
security where states claim the right to use any means necessary to hinder a development 
which goes against its interests. The Chinese goal of a peaceful international environment 
has been implemented in a variety of ways, of which pre-emptive desecuritization seems 
to be one. The paradigm example here is the maxim of “peaceful rise” (Zheng 2005, 
Glaser and Medeiros 2007), which can be seen as a rebuttal of the US China threat 
discourse, which China has countered with a desecuritization discourse (see e.g., Yee and 
Zhu 2000). The official maxim can be read as a pre-emptive move to avoid the domestic 
China threat discourse becoming official US policy. Indeed, Chinese observers have been 
attuned to both non-state and state discourse (Deng 2008: 113), and the pre-emptive 
stance aims to limit such views to the non-state level. The principle of “peaceful rise” 
                                                
4 For attempts at such avoidance in view of domestic authorities, see Paltemaa and Vuori (2006) and Vuori 
(2014). 
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pre-emptively argues that China is not a threat to other states’ security even as China’s 
“comprehensive national strength” and capacities to project it are on the increase.  
While “peaceful rise” and its subsequent rearticulation as “peaceful development” are 
directed against the concerns of major powers (Zheng 2005, Glaser and Medeiros 2007), 
a pre-emptive stance has also been discerned from China’s behavior in regard to the issue 
of transboundary rivers (Biba 2013). The maxim of “building good-neighbourly 
relationships and partnerships with our neighbors” works to alleviate the security 
concerns of regional and small states. Beyond such political slogans, China has 
consistently promoted a cooperative stance, even when China’s dam-projects have been 
framed in security terms; such a cooperative stance indicates a desire “to block and 
deflect potential securitization” of the dams (Biba 2013: 15-16). 
Desecuritization may then not only be about the termination of an institutional fact as has 
been suggested in previous literature (Vuori 2011a), but a move directed at the prevention 
of the construction, or solidification of an institutional fact. In the case of transboundary 
rivers, China has used a variety of means to prevent the escalation of the dam-projects 
into the realm of security. Assuaging rhetoric has been combined with increased 
transparency to produce intermittent cooperation in order to accommodate its neighbors 
concerns and worries (Biba 2013). Indeed, while the “peaceful rise” is directed at the US, 
other forms of pre-emptive desecuritization are at play with bordering states. 
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Securitization and Resiliencisation 
While desecuritization is a concept that has developed primarily within security studies, 
the ubiquity of resilience across the broad spectrum of the social sciences is indisputable. 
Several sets of arguments, factors, rationales and explicantia have recently been offered 
to better understand and explain resilience, now that psychologists, criminologists, social 
workers, biologists/ecologists, sociologists, and political scientists are all participating in 
debates about resilience.5 Although International Relations and Security Studies are 
latecomers to this field of research (Bourbeau 2015b, Juntunen and Hyvonen 2014, 
Chandler 2015, Corry 2014), in-depth engagement of security studies with the concept of 
resilience has primarily favoured one particular angle of the relationship between security 
and resilience, that is, where a resilient course of actions expresses itself once an issue 
has been successfully securitized (Arrow 3 in Figure 1).  
For instance, the United Nations (2011), together with several international organizations 
and non-governmental organizations, has invoked resilience as a new organizing 
principle, the development of which is perceived as critical to preventing unacceptable 
levels of human suffering and reducing the costs of international emergency responses. 
Resilience is understood as a particularly meaningful way to respond, or to adjust to a 
given securitized situation. This is also reflected in studies on terrorism and counter-
terrorism. Efforts to improve preparedness, especially at the community and local level, 
have intensified in the past decade, while emergency management infrastructure has 
become a top priority for several governments. Government initiatives, White papers, and 
                                                
5 See Bourbeau 2013.  
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key security statements arguing that resilience is a uniquely useful way to respond to 
these threats abound. In the UK, for example, resilience is a key component in the latest 
National Security Strategy (2010), where it is argued that to make “a strong Britain in an 
age of uncertainty” requires developing a “whole of government approach”; a central 
pillar of this approach is the development of domestic resilience in the face of terrorism. 
The UK is no exception: “resilience” is now a part of key security statements for the 
United States (2010), France (2013, 2008), the Netherlands (2010), and Australia (2011).  
Several scholars have also underscored the positive impact of resilience on individuals 
and communities caught in the middle of wars, conflicts, and chronic violence ― that is, 
situations in which security dynamics are already full-blown (Davis 2012, Goldstein 
2011, Muggah and Savage 2012,). Because resilient strategies give greater agency and 
voice to vulnerable people and local communities, resilience is also seen by some as a 
promising avenue to achieve sustainable poverty reduction and to circumscribe the power 
of police forces that have become exploiters of citizens’ vulnerabilities (Davis 2012). In 
short, security studies literature operates on the assumption that resilience processes 
occur after – or in response to – security (Balzacq 2015, Bourbeau 2015a). 
However, it is important that we also consider the role of resilience as a precursor to 
security – that is, as a process leading to and inducing security (Arrow 4 in Figure 1). 
Bourbeau’s (2013) notion of resilience as maintenance suggests one avenue by which 
resilience can induce security. Resilience as maintenance is characterized by an 
adaptation in which resources and energy are expended to maintain the status quo in the 
face of an exogenous shock. Re-affirmation of the value, benefit, and importance of the 
status quo will be made on several occasions. A society relying strongly on this type of 
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resilience will deal with endogenous and exogenous shocks with rigidity and underscore 
the potentially negative transformative consequences that may be brought about by these 
events. Disturbances or shocks are not by definition problematic; they must be socially 
constructed as negative via dominant discourses. This inward-looking strategy, which 
aims at protecting the social cohesion of a society, gives agents the opportunity, if they 
are so inclined, to present a novel disturbance as a security threat. Rhetoric and discursive 
powers will be deployed to portray the event as a problem and practices will be 
implemented in response. In other words, resilience as maintenance speaks to the idea of 
protecting a society’s “way of life” and this objective is made possible by the enactment 
of security policies. 
The case of how French dominant discourses adjusted to the surge in worldwide refugee 
numbers (from nine million in 1984 to eighteen million in 1992), and the associated 
mass-migration phenomena in post-Cold War France nicely illustrate our point that 
resilience can lead to security. Rising numbers of migrants fed alarmist tendencies, 
reinforcing the notion that France was being – or had already been – flooded with 
migrants. The metaphor of an invasion quickly became the dominant discourse through 
which the surge in worldwide refugee movement was to be interpreted. The exogenous 
shock of massive refugee and migrant pressure was portrayed as a considerable threat 
precisely so that security discourses and security practices would be called into play 
(Bourbeau 2011, 2014).  
The construction of international migration as a security issue was carried out most 
notably at two levels. First, migration was institutionally securitized — that is, new laws 
or articles modifying an existing law were passed, providing the government with tools to 
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deal with the “security problem” that was international migration (Freedman 2004, Van 
Munster 2009). Second, several security practices were put into place to deal with the 
threat of international migration including detention centres for migrants (in which the 
procedures, codes of conduct, and apparatus of operation are strikingly similar to those of 
incarceration facilities) and interdiction measures such as restrictive visa policies (Rodier 
2006, Fassin 2005, Welsh and Schuster 2005). In short, the surge in worldwide refugee 
numbers and associated “mass” migration was instrumentalized and the necessity of 
adopting a particular pattern of adjustments to uphold the status quo against changes 
provoked by these migratory events was underscored by dominant discourses in France. 
The social construction of refugee movements and mass migration as a significant 
disturbance necessitating a resilient strategy has led, ultimately, to the securitization of 
migration. 
 
Desecuritization and Resiliencization 
While the goal of resilience is sometimes to maintain the status quo (in which capacity it 
can induce security), on other occasions, its goal is renewal. Resilience-as-renewal is 
characterized by responses that transform security policy assumptions, remodel social 
structures and security practices, and, thus, lead to non-security politics (Arrow 5 in 
Figure 1). This type of resilience implies introducing novel vectors of response that will 
(in an implicit or explicit way) fundamentally change existing policies and set new 
directions for governance. Although the remodelling of policy assumptions does not take 
place in a social vacuum but draws on past experiences, collective memory, and the 
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windows of opportunity upon which agential powers decide to act, the option of renewal 
is, on some occasions, seen as inescapable. In this context, resilience-as-renewal 
supplements Hansen’s (2012) “rearticulation ideal” by suggesting the mechanism through 
which such rearticulation takes place.  
Some of the discussion about the link between resilience, security, and liberalism 
exemplifies this line of thought. For instance, the emergence of the resilience paradigm in 
the field of state-building intervention, claims David Chandler (2012, 2015), should be 
seen not as a mere transformation of liberalism, but as a rejection of it. This field is 
witnessing a fundamental transformation from the liberal internationalist framework in 
particular securitization dynamics and towards a growing focus on resilience (which 
includes preventive intervention and empowerment of local agency); bringing, ultimately, 
the issue outside of the security realm. 
Parallel to this debate, the broad field of conflict analysis offers a high-yielding source of 
example of resilience leading to non-security politics. Ami Carpenter, for example, has 
recently studied with great insights the patterns of adjustments of individuals and 
communities with conflict escalation in 10 of Baghdad’s neighbourhoods. She found that 
“short-term prevention of immediate violence and long-term efforts to reduce underlying 
issues that produce large-scale conflicts” are situated conceptually within the confines of 
resilience (2014: 5). Maria Buchanan and her colleagues (2013, 2007) analysed how 
Columbian child soldiers who were exposed to, and have experienced armed combat, but 
that did not exhibit trauma-related symptoms, dealt with the effects of war. These 
children did not identify with soldiers or combatants anymore, which was a univocal step 
towards the resolution of conflict. Buchanan et al. (2007, 2013) identify such patterns of 
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adjustment as an expression of resilience, which is similar to how Jacqueline McAdam 
(2013) regards the pattern of children’s survival in African zones of conflict as resilience 
too.  
While this particular understanding of the resilience–non-security politics vector (Arrow 
5 in Figure 1) is both insightful and controversial, it is also important to theorize the non-
security politics–resilience arrow (Arrow 6 in Figure 1). Here, a focus on resilience can 
enlighten us on the endurance of desecuritization. As we have seen in our discussion of 
the security–non-security politics relationship (Arrow 1 in Figure 1), most literature on 
desecuritization has focused on the mechanisms that remove issue away from the security 
realm. However, the necessary follow-up question to this analysis remains neglected and 
under-theorized in the literature: once the desecuritization of an issue is achieved, how 
does the issue manage to stay within the desecuritization realm? To be sure, the issue of 
such continuity in security studies is still vigorously debated, with many questions raised 
but few entirely resolved (e.g. Behnke 2006, de Wilde 2008, Donnelly 2015), but the 
resilience–non-security politics nexus may provide some headway here. 
Indeed, a focus on resilience can show that, on some occasions, what seems to be an 
idiosyncratic course of actions is in fact a culturally embedded pattern of adjustment to 
endogenous or exogenous shocks. While most rationalist explanations for continuity 
emphasize the maximization of benefit and the obtained Pareto-optimal equilibrium, a 
focus on resilience as a tool of explanation provides an informative alternative approach. 
Because a resilience-based analysis taps into sociological institutionalist explanations that 
focus on institutional practices, cultural frameworks, and path-dependencies, it holds 
great promise in explaining how a particular desecuritized understanding of an issue gets 
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“locked in” (Bourbeau 2015b, Hall and Taylor 1996, Mahoney and Thelen 2010). This 
suggests that how a society, a group, or an individual adjusts to a disturbance is deeply 
influenced by past trajectories and decisions, that a particular understanding of an issue 
tends to get established at critical moments, and that, once set in motion, a chosen 
pathway is difficult to alter. Acting as a self-reinforcing dynamic process, the focus on 
resilience underscores that on some occasions it is the securitizing move that comes to be 
seen as the disturbance or the shock to which a resilience strategy is deployed in order to 
maintain the desecuritized status quo.  
Several scholars working on genocide have highlighted the usefulness of a resilience 
focus in explaining the factors that impede mass atrocities (Ingelaere, Parmentier et al. 
2013). In their comparative analysis of Rwanda and Botswana, Deborah Mayersen and 
Stephen Mcloughlin (2011) suggests that a focus on resilience is a central element in 
understanding the pathways that led to genocide and mass atrocities in the former 
country, and not in the latter. Drawing from a multifaceted conception of resilience, they 
point out that the socio-historical construction and interpretation of ethnicity, as well as 
Botswana’s indigenous dispute resolution capacity, have had a lasting impact on that 
country’s enduring ability to keep ethnic relationships within the desecuritized realm and 
to prevent ethnic differences from escalating into ethnic conflict. Similarly, Witold 
Mucha (2013), in a comparison of escalation dynamics in Peru (1980-1995) and Bolivia 
(2000-2008), contends that a focus on resilience best explains why civil war broke out in 
the former country but not the latter, despite a similar structural conflict propensity in 
both nations. According to Mucha, the Bolivian state was able to activate resilient 
mechanisms that have ensured a constant de-escalation of the conflict and thereby 
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prevented a crossing of the threshold towards civil war. These mechanisms have “locked 
in” a desecuritized reading of the issue. 
Conclusion 
In the present article, we have introduced new avenues of conversation for security 
studies in several research clusters. We examined the conceptual space of security, 
resilience, and non-security politics as political status functions and the political moves 
that induce status transformations between them. In this, we highlighted the related 
political moves and processes of securitization, desecuritization, and resiliencization, 
both in situations where security as a status function and rationale is already established, 
and where it is still in the making. This provides more nuance for the investigation of 
political dynamics in regard to security, resilience, and non-security politics. Beyond the 
vast literature on securitization and desecuritization processes, our exploration of such 
interrelations provides some headway into studying how issues remain “desecuritized”, 
or move from resilient strategies towards security, for example. 
Our examination of this conceptual space is in tune with a renewed interest in the 
concepts of, and conceptual approaches towards World Politics (Berenskoetter 2016). 
Indeed, while our conceptual triangle engages with the dynamics among three growing 
literatures of securitization, desecuritization, and resilience studies, there still remain 
other transformations of rationales, modalities, and status functions to explore, for 
example the relation of our triangle towards risk and “riskification” (Corry 2012). 
Relatedly, we have engaged with the growing interest in security studies to seek 
commonalities rather than differences (Fierke 2007, Sylvester 2007) in order to avoid 
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some of the pitfalls of oppositional thinking (Williams 2012). In this modest attempt to 
embed a conceptualization of before-security dynamics into a triangle of political 
statuses, we have sought to demonstrate the benefit of opening up debates on the 
sequence of securitization processes and of zooming in on similarities, rather than the 
differences, among the various facets of such processes. We hope that the conceptual 
approach we have presented in the present article allows for the detection of further 
political dynamics that have remained understudied. 
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